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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For the crime of rape, a false belief that the other party was consenting should 
provide a complete defense1 only if the belief is reasonable.  This is a common 
view, one I defended years ago2 and hold without hesitation.  I won’t be defending 
it in this paper. 
Just what should count as a reasonable belief is a further question, and the 
tendency seems to be one of excessive generosity.  At least that is my experience: I 
almost never come across a sexual assault case where I think the mistaken belief 
that was deemed unreasonable perhaps should have been considered reasonable, 
and I fairly often read cases where the belief, apparently deemed by jurors or 
judges to be reasonable,3 strikes me as clearly unreasonable.  The case of Anna 
Stubblefield is of great interest because even if we are convinced that D.J. did not 
consent, it seems quite plausible that her belief that he did was reasonable.  Not 
that I am certain it was, and my concern is not primarily to argue that it was.  
Rather, I reflect on it, as well as another case,4 in an effort to sort out—and prompt 
reflection on—what should factor into a judgment that a mistaken belief that the 
other party was consenting was reasonable. 
My discussion will draw heavily on the Stubblefield case but not be an 
analysis of it.  I will leave it to others to discuss the trial court’s restrictive rulings 
and the appellate decision overturning the conviction on the grounds that those 
rulings prevented Stubblefield from fully presenting her defense.5  In order to 
focus on the mens rea issues, I’ll assume for the sake of discussion that D.J. did not 
consent.  (I’ll also assume that she believed he consented and that all testimony 
                                                                                                                                      
   Marcia Baron is the Rudy Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. She has published 
Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (1995), and (with Slote and Pettit) Three Methods of Ethics: 
A Debate (1997), as well as such articles as “Manipulativeness” (2003), “Justifications and Excuses” 
(2005), “Gender Issues in the Criminal Law” (2011), and “Shame and Shamelessness” (2018). 
1   I put it this way because to put it accurately would involve more legalese than is desirable, 
but technically it doesn’t count as a true defense; rather, one element of the offense, the mens rea, has 
not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 
203–04 (7th ed. 2015). 
2   See Marcia W. Baron, “I Thought She Consented,” 11 PHIL. ISSUES 1 (2001). 
3   Or at least, they judged that there is room for reasonable doubt as to whether it was 
unreasonable. 
4   R v. Tawera (1996) 14 CRNZ 290 (CA). 
5   State v. Stubblefield, 162 A.3d 1074, 1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). 
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from her that I report below was sincere.)  I emphasize that I do so strictly for the 
sake of discussion, with the purpose of throwing the mens rea issue into relief. 
Because they bear on the rest of my paper, I begin by explaining my starting 
points on sexual assault law—on what I think the law should be.  The first I 
already noted: a false belief that the complainant was consenting should be a 
complete defense only if it was reasonable.  I also think there should be no force 
requirement.  The actus reus of rape should be understood to be nonconsensual 
sex.  Not forced nonconsensual sex; not even forced sex (where non-consent does 
not have to be proven, only force does).6  Finally, sexual consent should be 
understood as distinct from wanting or desiring sex.  This is a less common point 
than the other two, so some elaboration is in order. 
 
II. CONSENT (OR: WHY NONCONSENSUAL SEX  
AND UNWANTED SEX ARE NOT IDENTICAL) 
 
Consent—whether to sex or to something else—is best understood as 
something one does (or in its noun form, something one gives) rather than as 
something one feels.  It is better understood as (roughly) a performative than as a 
mental state.7 
It is worth noting that some scholars agree that consent should not be equated 
with wanting or desiring yet maintain that it is a mental state.  I limit myself to 
arguing against the common conflation of consent with desire rather than examine 
views equating consent with, e.g., “[t]he mental state . . . of waiving one’s right to 
object.”8 
To consent to something, I maintain, is to agree to it (and to agree under 
conditions where one is reasonably free to decline).  A can desire something 
without agreeing to it, as when A feels a strong desire for sexual intimacy with B 
but for such reasons as that A is married to C, declines B’s invitation.  One can also 
agree to something without desiring it, as when one agrees to give a housemate a 
                                                                                                                                      
6   This is, however, a more plausible option than requiring both force and consent, and yet 
more plausible is understanding rape as coerced sex, following Scott A. Anderson, Conceptualizing 
Rape as Coerced Sex, 127 ETHICS 50 (2016). 
7   A mistake concerning this position needs to be corrected.  Larry Alexander presents as a 
“fatal problem for the performative view” that “for speech acts, there are . . . necessary mental state 
criteria, the absence of which will defeat the performative’s effectiveness.”  Larry Alexander, The 
Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL. 102, 103–04 (2014).  This could only be thought a problem 
if one supposed that on the performative view, mental states are irrelevant.  They aren’t; they factor 
in via the felicity conditions.  See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & 
Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975).  For more on the performative view, see Tom Dougherty, Yes 
Means Yes: Consent as Communication, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 224 (2015), and H.M. Malm, The 
Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on Rape, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 147 
(1996). 
8   Alexander, supra note 7, at 108. 
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ride to the airport, realizing that her need for the ride is greater than one’s own 
need to continue, without interruption, the translation one is working on.9  
This is so far just a conceptual point about consent, and one might retort, 
‘What’s in a word?  Even if consent and desire are not the same thing, might it not 
be useful for purposes of the law to understand sexual consent as sexual desire?’  
Point well taken, but I don’t see that it is useful.  On pragmatic grounds as well it 
is better not to equate them.  Wishful thinking combined with arrogance can easily 
support the thought, ‘I know she said “no” but I can tell she really wants it and I 
guess she doesn’t really know her own mind, or maybe she just has a hard time 
saying what she wants.’  If sexual consent and sexual desire are equated, the 
initiator may be well situated to say, ‘Yes, she consented!  She really did want it, 
though she denied it.’  This is true whether we understand the desire in question to 
be sexual desire or an all things considered desire to have sex (on this occasion and 
with this person), though the risk is probably greater if sexual consent is equated 
with sexual desire.10  By firmly distinguishing consent from both, we can make it 
clear that it is unacceptable to override the other person’s refusal or lack of consent 
with one’s own judgment of what she (or he) really wants. 
If A declines B’s invitation, that B thinks A really wants to have sex with B 
is—or should be—neither here nor there.  But if desire is treated as equivalent to 
consent, the option to refuse sex is dangerously undermined.  Does A have to 
convince B that she doesn’t want it, if B maintains that she does?  One wants to 
have one’s refusal taken seriously, recognized as authoritative.11  B might be in a 
suitable epistemic position to question whether A wants what A says A wants; but 
that A may be wrong about that has no bearing on whether A consented.  It is 
something B could bring up in an effort to try to persuade A to change her mind, 
but not to show that she has consented, or is consenting. 
It is worth noting that it is not only A, the person responding to an overture, 
who benefits from a distinction between consenting to X and desiring X.  Consider 
the matter from the perspective of B, the person initiating sex.12  B is better off if B 
can be confident that A really is consenting when A says ‘Sure!’  As long as the 
                                                                                                                                      
9   One might contest this, claiming that if one agrees to it, then even if one would in some 
sense rather work on the translation, one must want to provide the ride more than one wants to stay in 
and work on the translation.  Clearly this hangs on just how we understand the terms ‘want’ and 
‘desire’, an issue I will sidestep.  I am less concerned to convince readers of the conceptual point than 
to bring out the pragmatic reasons in favor of distinguishing consenting from wanting or desiring. 
10  Greater because it may be obvious that the other person is sexually aroused, and inferring 
sexual desire from arousal is more warranted than is inferring an all things considered desire to have 
sex.  The view that sexual desire constitutes (or at least suffices for) consent is very likely one reason 
for rape victims’ hesitation to report the crime to the police, and it would not be surprising if this 
were a particularly serious obstacle to male victims reporting an assault. 
11  On the matter of authority, see David Archard, The Mens Rea of Rape: Reasonableness and 
Culpable Mistakes, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 213, 222–
26 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999). 
12  Not that it is always the case that one person is the initiator, but these cases are of greater 
interest for my purposes because they are more likely to give rise to mistakes about consent. 
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conditions are not such as to raise worries that this was not consent but submission 
out of fear (or feeling so pressured that A feels she is being given no choice), and 
as long as there was no obvious sign of fear or distaste or something else that 
suggests that this might well not be consent, B should not be called upon—legally 
required—to check that A means what she said and is not merely submitting.  
There may be unclarities to sort out (‘Sure’ to which sexual activity?), but there 
should not be a legal requirement to try to figure out what A really wants.  
Moreover, the fear that later A will regret it and believe (possibly correctly, 
possibly not) that A never did want it and if sufficiently upset will go to the police, 
should have less of a foothold if it is made clear that what is crucial, for purposes 
of the law, is that A consented, not that A desired to have sex with B. 
A further point in favor of distinguishing between unwanted sex and 
nonconsensual sex is that without the distinction, it is hard to do justice to the 
importance of not having sex with someone too intoxicated to give consent or 
someone below the age of consent.  In each case the person might in fact want to 
have sex (and with the relevant party).  Yet we know better than to think that 
because a thirteen-year-old or an inebriated person wants to have sex with B that 
he or she is consenting to it. 
 
III. WHEN IS A MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT A CONSENTED REASONABLE? 
 
My aim is not, of course, to come up with a formula.  Rather, through 
reflection on both the Stubblefield case and a case where (or so I’ll argue, contra 
the Tawera court) the defendant’s belief should not count as reasonable, I’ll 
propose some guiding considerations and hopefully generate discussion of what we 
should want from a requirement of reasonableness in the context of criminal law 
defenses.  But first a quick statement of my starting points on reasonableness. 
I take it that ‘reasonable’ in ‘reasonable belief’ has to add something.  It 
should not be the case that as long as one really does believe p, one counts as 
having a reasonable belief that p.  Yet at the same time, the bar should not be high.  
This reflects the way we usually use the term ‘reasonable’ in ordinary discourse: a 
belief or action or person counts as reasonable simply by not being unreasonable.13  
But in the context of criminal law—perhaps especially when what is at stake is 
whether the mens rea requirement has been met—it is particularly important that 
the bar for reasonableness not be high. 
A more tentative starting point is that reasonableness is not primarily an 
epistemic concept.14  This is the case, I have argued, for our use of the notion in 
ordinary discourse;15 moreover, it is important for the criminal law that 
                                                                                                                                      
13  I elaborate in Marcia Baron, Reasonableness (last updated Feb. 11, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) and take up the issue of how high the bar should be for 
reasonableness in Marcia Baron, The Standard of the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law, in THE 
STRUCTURES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 11 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2011). 
14  See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999). 
15  Baron, Reasonableness, supra note 13. 
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requirements of reasonableness not focus on how well one reasons, but track 
features more critically important for culpability.  More on this later. 
I begin with R v. Tawera, a 1996 New Zealand case.16  Tawera (age 48) was 
convicted of raping17 his sixteen-year-old cousin, who was living with Tawera and 
his family.18  The appellate court overturned the conviction and directed that a 
verdict of acquittal be entered,19 explaining that “this is one of those rare cases 
when the verdicts cannot be supported, and . . . a reasonable assessment of the 
relevant evidence as a whole must have left a tribunal of fact with a reasonable 
doubt on this essential element.”20  The essential element was that the appellant not 
have believed on reasonable grounds that the complainant was consenting. 
I find this ruling intriguing because all seemed to be going so well: the 
relevant statute was admirably progressive, the jury rendered what seems clearly to 
be an appropriate verdict; and then the appellate court, for reasons I cannot fathom, 
directed that a verdict of acquittal be entered.  The statute was admirably 
progressive for a couple of reasons: first, it required only that sexual connection 
took place “without the consent of the other person” and “without believing on 
reasonable grounds that the other person consents to that sexual connection”;21 
there was no force requirement as there typically is in the U.S.  More notably, 
§128A includes an important stipulation, namely, “that a person does not protest or 
offer physical resistance to sexual connection does not by itself constitute consent 
to sexual connection for the purposes of section 128 of this Act.”22 
The evidence (not in dispute) was as follows: after the complainant got into 
her bed, Tawera got into the bed with her, uninvited.23  He initiated some intimacy; 
she showed no interest but also did not resist beyond trying to turn her head away 
when he attempted to put his tongue into her mouth (resistance which he 
overcame) and trying to hold her thighs together (again resistance he overcame).24  
Apart from the resistance just mentioned, her reaction was one of passivity, 
including giving no response when he asked, “Honey can I stick it in . . . ?”25 
                                                                                                                                      
16  (1996) 14 CRNZ 290 (CA). 
17  Id. at 290–91.  He was convicted of unlawful sexual connection as well, but as this raises 
no additional mens rea issues, I’m simplifying by focusing on the conviction for rape.  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. at 293.  Not that he was entirely a free man; he had also been charged with “having 
sexual intercourse with a girl under his care and protection.”  Id. at 291.  On that charge, no verdict 
had been taken, and the court ordered a new trial.  Id. at 293. 
20  Id. 
21  BUTTERWORTHS CRIMES ACT 1961, at 66 (Lee Andrew ed., 4th ed. 1997) (referring to 
Crimes Act 1961, s 128 (N.Z.)). For current and recent legislation, see http://www.legislation.govt.nz
/act/public/1961/0043/latest/versions.aspx?av=True [https://perma.cc/TZM4-BN62]. 
22  Id. (referring to Crimes Act 1961, s 128A (N.Z.)). 
23  Tawera, 14 CRNZ at 290–91. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. at 291. 
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Given that New Zealand law specifies that passivity by itself does not 
constitute consent, it is clear that this was nonconsensual sex.  For there was 
nothing other than a lack of resistance, verbal or physical, to point to as a reason 
for thinking she consented.  In fact, as noted, she did resist; but even if she had 
been completely passive, that would not, by itself, have constituted consent.  The 
court does not claim that it was consensual (nor that the prosecution failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was nonconsensual).  But it denies that the 
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the mens rea requirement was 
met.  The judges’ reasoning emerges when they offer a guess as to how the jurors 
could have arrived at a guilty verdict: 
 
It may be that the jury became unduly concerned about the direction 
(correctly given) on s 128A and the fact that a failure to protest or offer 
physical resistance does not by itself constitute consent.  That kind of 
consideration may of course be highly relevant to whether there was 
consent, but it does not really bear on the critical issue of belief in 
consent.26 
 
Not on the issue of belief in consent, but surely it bears on whether the belief was 
reasonable! 
If the law spells out that x does not suffice to constitute consent and D 
believes solely because of x that V consented, this cannot be a reasonable belief.  
Perhaps it could if we counted ignorance of the law as an excuse, but we don’t 
(except in rare circumstances, not relevant here).27  Treating that as a fixed point,28 
it matters that a mistaken belief that because she did not resist, she consented, is a 
mistake of law. 
The elements of the crime for which Tawera was convicted seem clearly to 
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court raises no worries 
concerning the act element, but holds that the mens rea was not proven.  However, 
if ‘reasonable’ in ‘reasonable grounds’ is going to play a role in §128, surely this 
mistaken belief that she was consenting is not based on reasonable grounds.  It is 
based only on the fact that she didn’t resist (more precisely, didn’t resist much). 
Now, were there no stipulation in the law that passivity does not by itself 
constitute consent, there would be some basis for arguing that although Tawera 
should have stopped his advances in the absence of any indication of consent, still, 
the bar for reasonableness needs to be set low.  Morally, sure (one might argue), 
                                                                                                                                      
26  Id. at 293. 
27  For the mistake of law/mistake of fact distinction, see DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 155–80 
and Kenneth W. Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 487, 489 (2012).  For a discussion of mistakes of law in connection with 
sexual consent, see MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 295–99 (2003). 
28  But see DOUGLAS HUSAK, IGNORANCE OF LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (2016) (arguing 
that ignorance of law usually should be a complete excuse from criminal liability). 
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but we are talking about legal culpability here.  For that the bar for reasonableness 
needs to be lower, and it would be too harsh to say that he acted unreasonably in 
thinking that more than an absence of robust resistance was needed (legally) for 
consent.  I am not sure I am on board, but it is not implausible, particularly if we 
take into account fair warning considerations.  But since §128A makes it quite 
clear that passivity alone does not suffice to constitute consent, there is no absence 
of fair warning.  It cannot be reasonable to substitute his own ideas of what 
suffices for consent. 
Reflection on Tawera suggests two points concerning when a mistaken belief 
that the other person is consenting is reasonable: 
First, the belief had better not be at odds with what the law tells us about what 
does, or does not, constitute consent.  The mistake has to be a mistake about a 
matter of fact (e.g. how old the other party is, or whether (s)he is only slightly tipsy 
rather than intoxicated, or what (s)he said), not about a matter of law. 
Second, in thinking about whether the defendant’s belief was unreasonable, 
we should attend to any steps (s)he took to ascertain whether the other party was 
consenting.  It is in Tawera’s favor that he did ask permission; the problem is that 
when she didn’t reply, he proceeded anyway. 
That in determining whether the mistaken belief should count as reasonable, 
one should take into account any such steps is part of U.K. law, and I think it 
should be part of all sexual assault laws.  The 2003 Sexual Offences Act specifies: 
“Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the 
circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.”29 
 
IV. THE STUBBLEFIELD CASE 
 
Anna Stubblefield was convicted in 2015 of two counts of first-degree 
aggravated sexual assault of D.J., a disabled man alleged by the State to be 
mentally incapacitated.30  I’ll assume for the sake of discussion that D.J. was 
incapable of consenting. 
                                                                                                                                      
29  Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/
42/part/1/crossheading/rape/section/1 [https://perma.cc/D8AZ-4J4T].  This Act governs England and 
Wales, and parts of it govern Northern Ireland; see also Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, (ASP 
9), (incorporating similar language regarding step-taking). 
30  State v. Stubblefield, 162 A.3d 1074, 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).  She was 
sentenced to two concurrent twelve-year prison terms, each with an 85% parole ineligibility period.  
Id.  The conviction was reversed in 2017 and remanded for a new trial before a different judge.  Id. at 
1083. As this article goes to press, Stubblefield has accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to third-
degree aggravated criminal sexual contact and admitting that she “should have known” that D.J. was 
“legally unable to consent.” On May 11, 2018, Judge Zunic sentenced Stubblefield to time served. 
Associated Press, Professor Accused of Assaulting Disabled Man Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
19, 2018, 2:39 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/03/19/us/ap-us-disabled-man-sexual-
consent.html [https://perma.cc/MV5X-QERK]; Alex Napoliello, No More Prison for ex-Rutgers 
Professor Who Sexually Assaulted Disabled Student, NJ.COM (May 11, 2018), 
http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2018/05/anna_stubblefield_sentenced_for_second_time.html 
[https://perma.cc/R7N2-PZ8G]. 
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Stubblefield believes that D.J. is not cognitively impaired.  There is no 
question that he cannot speak (and never has), that he wears a diaper, needs 
assistance in “every area of daily living,”31 and has trouble making eye contact and 
keeping objects fixed in view, nor is there any dispute about the diagnosis of 
cerebral palsy.32  But was it the case that he had only “the intellectual ability of a 
young child”33 and (quoting a psychologist’s assessment in 2004 for the New 
Jersey Bureau of Guardianship Services) that he lacked “the cognitive capacity to 
understand and participate in decisions”?34 
Stubblefield was convinced that D.J. was a very intelligent man who was 
merely unable, thanks to physical disabilities, to communicate his thoughts 
through any of the usual ways (talking, signing, writing, typing on his own).35  
Through what both proponents and critics call “facilitated communication” (FC), 
she sought to enable him to communicate.36  The method she employed involves 
holding one hand under the person’s elbow, the other over his hand, thereby 
addressing problems of motor control and coordination;37 the difficulty is that the 
facilitator may—many would say always does—unwittingly guide the person’s 
hand.38  He seemed to her a quick learner, with a lot to say and an enthusiasm for 
reading.39  They met regularly over the course of many months and—as she saw 
it—they fell in love.40  She was so convinced that the words typed were his, 
including his expression of interest in sex with her, that she had no doubt that 
everything they were doing, sex included, was mutual.41 
From my description so far, and on the assumption that the psychologist’s 
assessment was correct and that the words she helped D.J. type were hers rather 
than his, Stubblefield seems to be acting out a fantasy (without any notion that it is 
a fantasy).  She imagines him to be deep, thoughtful, full of ideas he is eager to 
share; she rescues him from a life in which his thoughts were trapped inside him; 
they fall in love, and now she gives him even more: a sexual relationship.  Insofar 
                                                                                                                                      
31  Id. at 1076. 
32  Daniel Engber, The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/the-strange-case-of-anna-stubblefield.html [https://
perma.cc/324H-VLPW].  An outstanding article to which I’m much indebted. 
33  Stubblefield, 162 A.3d at 1076. 
34  Engber, supra note 32. 
35  Her view, as she explains in the letter she wrote to Judge Teare prior to sentencing, is that 
she and D.J. are “intellectual equals.”  Daniel Engber, What Anna Stubblefield Believed She Was 
Doing, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/magazine/what-anna-
stubblefield-believed-she-was-doing.html [https://perma.cc/4F9L-KJ56]. 
36  Engber, supra note 32. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
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as we think of her as living out a fantasy, she bears some striking similarities to 
Benigno, a character in the film “Hable con Ella” (“Talk to Her”), directed by 
Pedro Almodóvar.42 
Benigno, a nurse, is infatuated with Alicia, a young dancer whom he observes 
from afar (thanks to having a view from his apartment of her dance studio).43  
When she is seriously injured in a car accident, Alicia ends up with Benigno as her 
nurse.44  Tending to her in her stable, comatose state goes on for months, even 
years.45  Thanks to another nurse needing some time off, Benigno finds himself 
alone with Alicia for long stretches, including some nights.46  As viewers, we 
aren’t quite sure what to make of his practice of talking to her as if she can hear 
and comprehend his detailed reports of (among other things) theatre performances.  
Nor do we know what to think of the intimate massages he lovingly gives her, 
because although better for her than being touched only minimally, they are also 
more gratifying to him than is appropriate.  Should we bracket this, we wonder?  
Treating a comatose person as if she can listen to him, dressing her up and taking 
her out on a balcony to enjoy the breeze and the sunshine—all this seems better, 
we initially tell ourselves, than treating her as just a physical body.  But we soon 
realize that this is not a case of treating her “as if . . . .”  As he sees it, they are a 
couple.  When he tells his friend, Marco, that he plans to marry Alicia—not that he 
hopes to marry her if she ever emerges from a coma, but that he plans to marry her 
in her current state—he seems fully unprepared for Marco’s reaction of horror.  
Soon we see how far Benigno has taken what we, but not he, see as a fantasy: she 
is pregnant. 
One of the fascinating features of “Talk to Her” is that Benigno intensely 
enjoys his imagined relationship in part because it is his own construction.  (Of 
course, it matters that he doesn’t regard it as such.)  He doesn’t have the challenges 
of a real relationship; he does all the talking and never suffers the hardships that 
those with real relationships have—feeling put down, being challenged or 
contradicted when you wanted support, realizing that your partner wasn’t listening 
to you or was bored by your story.  He doesn’t have to contend with grumpiness, 
nor worry that something he says will offend her.  He can idealize her without 
having to face disappointment.  There are no arguments.  “Why shouldn’t we get 
married?” he says to Marco.  “We get along better than most married couples.”47 
Against some striking similarities, there are important dissimilarities, 
including this one: Benigno talked to a motionless, unresponsive Alicia.  By 
contrast, when Stubblefield declared her feelings for D.J., he typed back “I love 
                                                                                                                                      
42  TALK TO HER (Sony Pictures Classics 2002). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
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you, too” and shortly thereafter, “So now what?”48  Whereas Benigno had no reply 
to Marco’s emphatic “It’s just a monologue!”49  Stubblefield fully believes that she 
and D.J. are engaged in dialogue.  And she has a partner who says what she wants 
to hear, yet at the same time is an unfolding personality, full of (what seem to her) 
surprises. 
The jurors reportedly were baffled: how could Stubblefield love him?  I think 
that betrays a failure to appreciate the powers of the imagination and the draw of a 
fantasized relationship (provided that the person immersed in the fantasized 
relationship can see it as not a mere fantasy).  One can imagine the loved one to be 
(almost) whatever one wants him to be; one can enjoy being with him without 
being challenged or contradicted.  Yet at the same time, one is not alone, as one is 
in a purely fantasized relationship.  For both Benigno and Stubblefield, there is this 
real person, of flesh and blood, and the person is present (although Alicia is only 
physically present).  Moreover, in both cases the person is one’s project.  
Stubblefield devoted a significant portion of her free time to enabling D.J. to 
communicate, to realize his potential, to live a real life.  Thanks to her, he has 
transformed from someone whose pleasures, apart from eating, consisted mainly in 
playing with plastic coat hangers into a man who reads voraciously such works as 
those of Maya Angelou and who, with Stubblefield’s help, writes papers that are 
delivered at conferences.  No wonder she loves him! 
Enough on the parallels.  Here is the difference I want to highlight: whereas 
any suggestion that Benigno believed on reasonable grounds that the comatose 
Alicia consented to sex with him would be utterly preposterous, a suggestion that 
Stubblefield believed on reasonable grounds that D.J. consented to sex with her is 
not preposterous. 
 
V. SOME GROUNDS FOR DEEMING STUBBLEFIELD’S BELIEF REASONABLE 
 
Stubblefield was not simply creating her own fantasy in thinking that D.J. was 
mentally far sharper than the psychologists’ assessments indicated and that he was 
communicating his thoughts through FC.  To see this, we need to delve further into 
the history of Stubblefield and D.J.’s relationship.50 
                                                                                                                                      
48  Engber, supra note 32. 
49  TALK TO HER, supra note 42. 
50  In recounting the history, I rely on Engber, supra note 32 and State v. Stubblefield, 162 
A.3d 1074, 1075–76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017), and use the initials and names that Engber 
uses to refer to D.J. and D.J.’s mother and brother.  I leave out some details that although important 
to understanding some of the dynamics, are not relevant to the question of whether her belief that D.J. 
consented should count as reasonable.  These include the racial components (D.J. is black; 
Stubblefield is white; Stubblefield’s then-husband is black; Stubblefield’s research areas included 
philosophy of race and she was the first and thus far only white scholar to chair the American 
Philosophical Association’s Committee on the Status of Black Philosophers) and the relationship that 
developed between Stubblefield and D.J.’s mother and brother (“She was like family,” Wesley said in 
a deposition).  For these details and more, see Engber, supra note 32. 
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They met in 2009 through his brother, Wesley, a student in one of her classes 
at Rutgers-Newark.51  (Stubblefield was a professor in, and chair of, the philosophy 
department.)52  After she showed the class part of a documentary53 depicting a 
nonverbal girl with an I.Q. of 29 who, thanks to FC, managed to go to college, 
Wesley told Stubblefield about his brother and asked if D.J. might be able to utilize 
FC.54  Soon she was working with D.J. every other Saturday at Rutgers.55  Wesley 
and D.J.’s mother, P., were delighted by his rapid progress, and P. invited 
Stubblefield to her home for more frequent FC sessions.56 
Some months later, Stubblefield’s mother, Sandra McClennen, suggested that 
D.J. write a short conference paper for a session she was organizing for the Society 
for Disability Studies.57  Stubblefield and D.J. worked together on the essay, and in 
June 2010, D.J. traveled with Wesley and their mother to the conference, where 
Wesley presented the paper.58  Subsequently, Stubblefield helped D.J. write 
another conference paper.59  Stubblefield, D.J., and P. traveled together to this 
conference, where Stubblefield’s father presented the paper.60  The paper was 
subsequently published in a peer-reviewed journal, Disability Studies Quarterly.61  
In Fall 2010, D.J. sat in on a 400-level course in African-American literature, 
assisted in his homework by FC provided by Sheronda Jones, an undergraduate 
recruited by Stubblefield.62 
I’ve recounted this to offer reasons for thinking that Stubblefield’s belief that 
D.J. was communicating his own thoughts via FC should count as reasonable for 
purposes of criminal law.  That those who knew D.J. best—his mother and 
brother—also saw him to be conveying his own thoughts through FC provided 
Stubblefield with some confirmation of her belief that he was doing so (though the 
fact, of which she should have been aware, that naturally this is what relatives want 
to believe reduces the confirmatory value).  By the time Stubblefield and D.J.’s 
relationship had taken a sexual turn—Spring 2011—Wesley had begun to have 
doubts about FC, but he did not share this with Stubblefield.  By all reports, no one 
was relaying to Stubblefield any worries about whose thoughts were being typed 
                                                                                                                                      
51  Engber, supra note 32. 
52  Stubblefield, 162 A.3d at 1075. 
53  AUTISM IS A WORLD (Cable News Network 2004). 
54  Engber, supra note 32. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  DMan Johnson, The Role of Communication in Thought, 31 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2011), 
http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1717/1765 [https://perma.cc/358D-U6XG].  It was later retracted, 
though not for reasons concerning authorship. 
62  Engber, supra note 32. 
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out, hers or D.J.’s.  Her confidence in him and in FC was reinforced by more than 
just a few people: in addition to D.J.’s mother and brother, Stubblefield’s parents, 
Sheronda Jones, those who attended the conference presentations of his papers, 
and (arguably) the editor(s) of the journal where one of the papers was published 
under his name.63  Her confidence was also bolstered by the firm endorsement of 
FC by such people as Professor Douglas Biklen, founder of the Facilitated 
Communication Institute and, from 2006–2014, Dean of the Syracuse University 
School of Education, and by the appreciation of others for whom she served as a 
facilitator.64 
If her belief that D.J. was communicating his thoughts through FC was 
reasonable, so was her belief that D.J. was not mentally handicapped and that the 
psychologist’s assessment was thus totally wrong.  After all, he could fruitfully sit 
in on an advanced undergraduate course and even write conference papers!  On the 
assumption that the papers written by FC were authored by D.J. and that the 
contributions to their FC conversations really were his, the reasons for thinking 
that he does not have the “mental age” to consent evaporate. 
To be sure, many of the people who believed FC worked believed this not on 
independent grounds, but in part because Stubblefield believed it.  Wesley learned 
about FC from her, as did his mother; Sheronda Jones would have been influenced 
by the fact that D.J. was auditing the course and by the request that she aid him by 
using FC.  So the ‘confirmation’ I spoke of was not exactly an independent 
confirmation. 
But there was more ratification than just that.  Her parents did not support her 
merely out of friendly support for a daughter; Stubblefield’s mother, Sandra 
McClennen, had been working with cognitively impaired children since 1963 and 
began using FC long before Stubblefield did.65  As a professor at Eastern Michigan 
University, McClennen taught her students to “never judge people with disabilities 
by their outward appearance”; as a licensed psychologist sought out by parents of 
disabled children when they felt their children were being underestimated by 
school psychologists, she “worked with the schools to set up more appropriate 
accommodations” and to find “better methods of communication for students who 
could not speak” (as Stubblefield explained in a letter she wrote to Judge Teare 
while awaiting sentencing).66  From her invitation to D.J. to contribute to a 
                                                                                                                                      
63  Johnson, supra note 61.  It is clear from the content of the paper that the author is an FC-
user; moreover, the contact information provided for him is Stubblefield’s.  That they accepted the 
paper thus seems to be an endorsement of it as an outcome of facilitated communication. 
64  Engber, supra note 32.  The article mentions that one of them, Zach DeMeo, whose mother 
came to Stubblefield’s trial to show their support.  Id.  Zach’s mother is quoted as saying, “It changed 
his life. . . .  She was so selfless and devoted . . . She speaks to my son as an equal. . . .  She treats him 
as a human being.  If he told me he was in love with her, I would believe him.”  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Letter from Anna Stubblefield to Superior Court Judge Siobhan Teare (Dec. 26, 2015) in 
Bill Wichert, Professor Sentenced to Prison for Sexual Assault of Disabled Man, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 
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conference, we surmise that she shared her daughter’s rejection of the 
psychologists’ assessment.  (And she was not merely relying on Stubblefield’s 
reports of D.J.; she met and typed with him).67 
I mentioned confirmation from the community of FC providers, and we 
should bear in mind that that community is not on a par with, say, palm-readers.  
The main institute for FC is housed at Syracuse University (though in 2010 it 
changed its name from ‘Facilitated Communication Institute’ to ‘Institute on 
Communication and Inclusion’ because of controversy about FC).68  Although 
highly controversial, FC has a fair number of academic supporters.  In addition, FC 
is endorsed by the Autism National Committee in a policy statement.69 
I stated earlier that the steps taken to ascertain whether the other party is 
consenting should factor into an assessment of the reasonableness of the belief.  So 
we should note in this connection that Stubblefield, according to her testimony, 
sought to ensure ongoing communication from D.J. during their sexual encounters.  
If D.J. wanted to say something, he would bang on the floor, and she would set 
him up with the keyboard.70 
 
VI. SOME GROUNDS FOR THINKING STUBBLEFIELD’S MISTAKEN BELIEF 
UNREASONABLE 
 
There is ample room for doubt about the reasonableness of her belief that D.J. 
was consenting.  She held (and from all reports, holds) her beliefs about the 
reliability of FC and its effectiveness with D.J. with a fierce tenacity, refusing to 
consider the possibility that what D.J. typed were her thoughts, not his.  This to my 
mind is the main reason for thinking that her belief that he was consenting was not 
reasonable or, to put it in the terms used in the New Jersey statute under which she 
was charged and convicted, that she “should have known” that he wasn’t 
consenting.71 
Even on the assumption that prior to her announcement that they were in love 
no one directly challenged her assumption that FC was working for D.J., it is clear 
                                                                                                                                                      
2016), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2016/01/in_jailhouse_letter_professor_convicted_of_sex_
ass.html [https://perma.cc/2NRC-82PK]. 
67  Engber, supra note 32. 
68  Id. 
69  Autism National Committee Policy and Principles Regarding Facilitated Communication, 
AUTISM NAT’L COMM. (2008), http://www.autcom.org/articles/PPFC.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW3G-
PBFZ]. 
70  Engber, supra note 32. 
71  More aptly, though less like the language of the New Jersey statute: should have suspected 
that he might not be consenting. See N.J. STAT. § 2C:14-2 (7) (2014). (“The victim is one whom the 
actor knew or should have known was physically helpless or incapacitated, intellectually or mentally 
incapacitated, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or 
permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being 
incapable of providing consent.”) 
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that Stubblefield was aware that facilitators at least sometimes unknowingly guide 
the typing.  One such case, recounted in 1993 on “Frontline” and in 1994 on 
“20/20,” was that of Betsy Wheaton, an autistic teenager whose parents were 
charged with child abuse solely on the basis of messages typed using FC.72  Many 
other such cases came to light,73 and as FC was tested, it became clear that the 
“ideomotor” (or Ouija board) effect was extremely common and that FC (in the 
form that Stubblefield used)74 very rarely (if ever) worked.75  The American 
Psychological Association issued a resolution in 1994 that there was “no 
scientifically demonstrated support for its efficacy” and several other professional 
organizations issued similar warnings.76  For those serving as FC facilitators, there 
was no escaping the claims that FC was at best highly unreliable, at worst totally 
worthless.  No escaping—but that doesn’t mean they gave them serious 
consideration. 
The evidence that Stubblefield knew of the controversy about FC comes not 
only from it being impossible for her not to know, but from her published work.  In 
her “Sound and Fury: When Opposition to Facilitated Communication Functions 
as Hate Speech,” she dismisses the worries that FC is unreliable, pointing out that 
                                                                                                                                      
72  Wheaton’s facilitator writes poignantly about her discovery, thanks to testing to which she 
reluctantly submitted, that she, rather than Wheaton, was the author of the messages.  See Janyce 
Boynton, Facilitated Communication—What Harm It Can Do: Confessions of a Former Facilitator, 
6 EVIDENCE-BASED COMM. ASSESSMENT & INTERVENTION 3 (2012). 
73  See, e.g., John Wisely, Was Autistic Girl Abused?  Former Prosecutor Won’t Say, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Oct. 23, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/–oakland–
/2014/10/23/lawsuit-targets-facilitated-communication/17796093/ [https://perma.cc/ZL7S-QW4L].  
For discussion, see KENNETH A. KAVALE & MARK P. MOSTERT, THE POSITIVE SIDE OF SPECIAL 
EDUCATION: MINIMIZING ITS FADS, FANCIES, AND FOLLIES (2004). 
74  I say this because ‘FC’ is sometimes used to refer to facilitation that involves far less 
guidance, e.g. steadying an elbow or holding the keyboard.  In addition, it reportedly can sometimes 
be effectively used as a stepping-stone to enable the user soon to type independently.  See David M. 
Perry, Sexual Ableism, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.lareviewof
books.org/article/sexual-ableism/ [https://perma.cc/3Z69-EGCM]. 
75  According to Boynton, “Every facilitator moves their communication partner’s arm and 
authors the FC messages,” Boynton, supra note 72, at 12.  See KAVALE & MOSTERT, supra note 73 
(for a review of studies testing FC); Mark P. Mostert, Facilitated Communication Since 1995: A 
Review of Published Studies, 31 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 287 (2001).  See also 
Mark P. Mostert, Facilitated Communication and Its Legitimacy—Twenty-First Century 
Developments, 18 EXCEPTIONALITY 31 (2010).  For discussions by proponents of FC, see CONTESTED 
WORDS, CONTESTED SCIENCE: UNRAVELING THE FACILITATED COMMUNICATION CONTROVERSY 
(Douglas Biklen & Donald N. Cardinal eds., 1997). 
76  Facilitated Communication: Sifting the Psychological Wheat from the Chaff, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N (Nov. 20, 2003), http://www.apa.org/research/action/facilitated.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NWM-
Z8FP].  Many other organizations have warned against it, as well.  For a list, plus the text of several 
such statements, see Resolutions and Statements by Scientific, Professional, Medical, Governmental, 
and Support Organizations Against the Use of Facilitated Communication, BEHAV. ANALYSIS ASS’N 
MICHIGAN, http://www.baam.emich.edu/baamsciencewatch/baamfcresolutions.htm [https://perma.cc
/NSG2-W8UM]. 
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this is true of other modes of communication, too, so why the focus on FC?77  
Perhaps part of the answer, she suggests, is the quickness with which many read 
off profound intellectual impairment from such physical disabilities as the inability 
to speak and difficulty initiating or controlling the movements of one’s arms and 
hands. “[T]o an observer who assumes that the FC user is profoundly intellectually 
impaired, it will appear unbelievable that he can be given access to a means of 
communication that involves literacy and immediately type meaningful words and 
sentences.”78  Her main thesis: “[A]nti-FC expression functions as hate speech 
when it calls into question, without substantiation, the intellectual competence of 
FC users, thereby undermining their opportunity to exercise their right to freedom 
of expression.”79  As for the scientific research, in addition to questioning what it 
really establishes, Stubblefield endorses the following statement, by another 
author: “Research is really useless as its own reward.  The only good purpose for 
research is liberation from our limitations.  Research designed to make those 
limitations more real and more legitimate must be stopped.”80 
It is clear from her published work that she was well aware of the FC 
controversy.  It is also evident that she had no interest in considering the possibility 
that FC might be unreliable, and a great deal of interest in discrediting the 
objections to it.  This lends support to the position that her belief in FC was 
unreasonable, and likewise her belief that D.J. was consenting to sex with her.  But 
there are other factors to consider. 
 
VII. FURTHER FACTORS 
 
In this section I complicate what I’ve written above by factoring in some other 
considerations (some of which were mentioned earlier in my paper).  I do so with 
the aim of getting clearer both on how we should go about assessing, for purposes 
of deciding whether the mens rea requirement is met, the reasonableness of a belief 
that the other party is consenting, and on how we should evaluate Stubblefield’s 
belief (supposed for the purposes of discussion to be false) that D.J. consented.  I 
begin with a list of relevant factors. 
 
1. As noted above, the bar for reasonableness for purposes of the 
criminal law needs to be fairly low. 
                                                                                                                                      
77  Anna Stubblefield, Sound and Fury: When Opposition to Facilitated Communication 
Functions as Hate Speech, 31 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2011). 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. (quoting Eugene Marcus, reportedly an FC-user). 
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2. Also as noted above, a crucial consideration is what steps the 
defendant took to be sure that the person was consenting.81 
3. For purposes of assessing the reasonableness of a belief that rests on 
a highly controversial background belief, that the latter is held by a 
fairly large number of people is relevant.  It counts for something. 
 
But other considerations enter in, among them: 
 
4. Are the controversial supporting beliefs held only by a very insular, 
us-against-them community? 
5. Is there a way to test a (crucial) supporting belief, and if there is, at 
what cost?  If the defendant did not opt to have it tested, despite it 
being low cost or cost-free to do so, why not? 
6. When, as in this case, the background beliefs are held tenaciously, 
what is the underlying motivation? 
 
I want to suggest that it matters whether the motivation for the belief is (e.g.) 
to improve the lot of others or (e.g.) to provide oneself with a rationalization for 
exploiting or abusing others.  One might contend that this should factor in only at 
sentencing, not for purposes of assessing reasonableness; but I think that unless 
reasonableness is understood to be purely epistemic, the agent’s motivation for 
(tenaciously) holding the belief sometimes does bear on the reasonableness of her 
belief.  More on this shortly. 
Now, to some extent (2), (4) and the first part of (5) lend further support to the 
thought that Stubblefield’s belief was unreasonable.  On (2), the verdict is mixed.  
On the one hand, one is hard pressed to name another sexual assault case that has 
gone to trial (let alone resulted in a conviction) where the accused sought as much 
as she did to ensure both initial consent and ongoing consent and was as concerned 
that the other party consent not merely to please her, but because this was really 
something he wanted.  But on the other, she refused to take seriously the 
possibility that the assumptions on which her belief that he was consenting rested 
were false, namely that FC is reliable and specifically that her use of FC with D.J. 
is reliable.  When something as important as sexual consent is at stake, the 
assumption that FC was working cannot be taken for granted.  She thus failed to 
                                                                                                                                      
81  With regard to other crimes, it won’t be consent, but a different factor to which the 
defendant should be attending.  The Model Penal Code definition of the culpability level of 
negligence is useful to bear in mind: 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should 
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will 
result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s 
failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
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take a step she absolutely should have taken: she failed to have her use of FC with 
him tested. 
The test (and I am now addressing the first part of (5)) is simple.  It is easy to 
test the effectiveness of FC for a particular FC pair.  The basic idea is that a third 
party asks the FC-user questions whose answers the FC-user would know but the 
facilitator would not know, e.g. the names of the FC-user’s cousins.  The test may 
also involve showing the facilitator a picture, showing the FC-user a different 
picture (of some easily identifiable object, such as a shoe or a banana), and then 
asking the FC-user to label the object.82  In sum, the answer to the first part of (5) 
is straightforward: Yes, and the only cost is that of humiliation and deep distress 
for the facilitator in the event of failure (obviously not a cost that should be taken 
into account). 
Before considering the second part of (5), we can briefly address (3) and (4).  
It isn’t altogether clear how large a number of people believe that FC (including 
the form Stubblefield was using) is reliable, but it certainly does seem to be the 
case that an us-against-them mentality is pervasive among FC-facilitators and other 
FC-proponents.83 
This us-against-them mentality is also relevant to both (1) and the second part 
of (5).  A detailed autobiographical account from former FC facilitator Janyce 
Boynton brings out how difficult it would be for someone in the FC community to 
opt to be tested, in part because of the mentality just noted.84  Those favoring 
testing were demonized, as were those who offered and administered such tests; 
and it was impressed upon facilitators that testing would be stressful for the FC-
user and administered in an “adversarial” fashion.85  Boynton reports her surprise, 
when she and Wheaton were tested, at how gentle and non-adversarial the testing 
was.86 
The pressures against being tested were enormous.  FC was supposed to 
require trust in both the person one was helping and the process itself.87  It would 
be very difficult to remain a committed facilitator and opt for testing, since part of 
being a good facilitator is to have faith.  That it would have been so difficult does 
not begin to justify Stubblefield’s failure to have her use of FC with D.J. evaluated.  
But it does suggest that it might be setting the bar for reasonableness (for purposes 
                                                                                                                                      
82  For more detail, see Boynton, supra note 72. 
83  See id.; KAVALE & MOSTERT, supra note 73; Engber, supra note 32. 
84  Boynton, supra note 72. 
85  Id. at 11.  I use the past tense not because I have reason to think this has changed, but 
because what Boynton reports on is from the 1990s.  Engber’s report, however, is quite similar, and 
concerns much more recent events, in particular, the 2014 annual Syracuse conference for typers and 
facilitators. 
86  Id. 
87  Also highlighted by Boynton as an obstacle to choosing to be tested was the fear of 
learning that one is one of the “‘bad’ facilitators” who do it improperly and give FC a bad name.  Id. 
at 9. 
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of criminal law) a bit on the high side to deem her belief unreasonable, given that it 
would be a very rare and unusually courageous and “free-thinking” FC-facilitator 
who would opt to have his or her use of FC tested.88 
 
VIII. THE REASONABLENESS OF A BELIEF AND  
THE MOTIVATION FOR THAT BELIEF 
 
The above paragraph serves as a partial answer to the second part of (5) and to 
(6).  But there is more to be said, particularly about the motivation for believing in 
FC in the first place.  Behind the confidence in FC—and especially in its 
effectiveness for the particular person one is assisting—is the conviction that one 
should err in the direction of overestimating, not underestimating, the capacities of 
the person thought to be cognitively disabled.  We do best (the ideology has it) to 
assume that the person’s “mental age” matches his chronological age unless the 
evidence forces us to revise this; we do best to figure that the impairments are only 
physical; we do best to figure that he has thoughts, wants to learn, wants to live as 
an independent adult, and then try to facilitate his doing so.  Are we to wait, one 
might ask, until either a more effective method is found or FC is determined to be 
pretty reliable after all, when we have people leading extremely limited lives who 
might be helped by FC to express their thoughts, become more independent, and to 
gain more control over their lives? 
This ideology is certainly not innocuous, as is obvious from both this case and 
the many cases of parents accused of child abuse on the strength of FC messages.  
But my point is that the tenacity of Stubblefield’s beliefs and her unwillingness to 
take criticisms of FC seriously were not due to an ugly motivation such as that of 
Clifford’s ship-owner, who talked himself out of his doubts about the 
seaworthiness of his emigrant-ship because he knew that to overhaul it would be 
very expensive.89  Stubblefield’s beliefs seem to be motivated by a genuine 
concern to enable those with disabilities to lead richer lives.  This is not the case of 
a woman who, feeling powerfully attracted to someone she (vaguely) realizes is 
too cognitively impaired to be capable of consent, searches for an ideology that 
allows her to see him as only physically disabled and thus presumably capable of 
consent.90 
                                                                                                                                      
88  A complicating factor, however, is Stubblefield’s education, specifically, that she has a 
Ph.D. (and from a top department) in philosophy, a field in which we are taught to think critically.  
One might argue that although it is true that the bar for reasonableness has to be set low enough that 
it doesn’t require heroism to reach it, it should be raised a notch or two if one has the skills and 
practice in reasoning that should enable one to rise above the rhetoric about FC and think critically 
about possible dangers in relying on it. 
89  W.K. CLIFFORD, The Ethics of Belief, in THE ETHICS OF BELIEF AND OTHER ESSAYS 70, 70 
(1999). 
90  Judge Teare saw things differently.  When sentencing Stubblefield, she pronounced 
Stubblefield’s actions “the perfect example of a predator preying on their prey.”  State v. 
Stubblefield, 162 A. 3d 1074, 1083 (2017). 
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There is of course room to argue that such considerations should enter in only 
at sentencing.  Why think they bear on reasonableness?  I cannot do justice to this 
question here, but suggest that to answer it we need to reflect on what we want 
from a requirement that to negate the mens rea, the belief that the other party was 
consenting must have been reasonable.  As I said at the outset, I am taking as given 
that we do not want the mens rea to be negated simply by a genuine belief that V 
was consenting.  So my question is not whether we should require reasonableness, 
but what we want from it.  What should a judgment of unreasonableness track?  
This much is clear: we want a belief’s failure to qualify as reasonable to track 
culpability, culpability of a sort that we think suffices for criminal law purposes, 
culpability that plausibly renders someone criminally liable (for this type of 
offense).91 
Here is what a judgment of unreasonableness usually tracks: culpable 
indifference.92  It need not be complete indifference; Tawera may not have been 
entirely indifferent.  After all, he did ask; but he wasn’t concerned enough to stop 
what he was doing when she did not answer and her actions in no way indicated 
consent.  The contrast to Stubblefield is striking93: there is no hint of indifference 
(culpable or otherwise) as to whether D.J. consented.  She discussed with him in 
advance what they were contemplating doing, and during their encounters she 
sought to ensure that there was continued consent.  To be sure, she did so using 
FC.  But we can grant that she should not have relied on it while also recognizing 
that her confidence in FC was deep and genuine, informed since childhood by her 
mother’s work.  Her belief in FC and the underlying ideology predated her 
acquaintance with D.J.  It was not a belief she cultivated in herself in order to 
rationalize something that she knew or suspected was wrong. 
As I see it, most cases where D incorrectly believes V was consenting are 
cases where the belief should count as unreasonable.  These cases generally divide 
(with significant overlap) into two types: (a) those where D deceived himself into 
thinking V consented in order to rationalize D’s conduct, i.e., in order to be able to 
proceed without feeling he is acting wrongly; and (b) those where D believes V 
consented because (say) of the way V was dressed or because V invited him to her 
apartment for a drink, together with a belief that ‘No’ may not mean ‘No’ and can 
therefore be legitimately ignored.  Stubblefield certainly can’t be placed in the first 
group.  (If she deceived herself, it was not in order to rationalize her conduct.)  
What about the second?  This is where the underlying ideology is relevant.  
                                                                                                                                      
91  The same question can be asked with respect to the language used in the NJ statute: what 
do we want ‘should have known’ to track?  What differentiates A, who should have known but didn’t, 
from B, who also didn’t know, but about whom we do not think we should say ‘he should have 
known,’ such that the difference warrants saying that A, but not B, has the required mens rea? 
92  I am speaking here of the unreasonableness of a belief that the other party was consenting.  
Whether it holds more broadly than that is not something I can take up here. 
93  And, of course, the contrast between Stubblefield and the rapist who did not believe the 
victim was consenting, and who either cared not at all or took pleasure in their not consenting, is all 
the more striking. 
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Contrast the beliefs just noted with Stubblefield’s.  In the cases where the belief 
clearly should count as unreasonable, there is serious disrespect shown towards 
those in the group in question (towards V and others whose behavior D would so 
interpret).  By contrast, underlying Stubblefield’s belief that D.J. was consenting 
was respect for those judged to be cognitively disabled, respect that, sadly, took a 
form that blocked her from considering that he might be so severely impaired as to 
be incapable of consenting. 
 
IX. A POSSIBLE OBJECTION 
 
One might argue that given what I said about Tawera, I should take the 
position that Stubblefield’s belief that D.J. was consenting was clearly 
unreasonable.  I said that because Tawera’s belief that his cousin was consenting to 
sex with him was based only on her passivity and it is explicitly stated in New 
Zealand law that passivity alone does not constitute consent, his belief should not 
count as reasonable.  One might claim that for similar reasons, Stubblefield’s belief 
that D.J. was consenting cannot be reasonable because as a matter of law, he could 
not consent.  He was deemed by the State of New Jersey to be mentally below—far 
below—the age of an adult and therefore was appointed guardians; and 
Stubblefield knew this.  Hence she either knew or should have known that he was 
as a matter of law incapable of consent.94  If she judged otherwise, that was a 
mistake of law, just as (I claimed) Tawera’s view that his cousin was consenting 
involved a mistake of law. 
I don’t think this is correct.  That consent is defined as X is a matter of law; 
that person S is incapable of consent—consent as defined by the law—should not 
be considered a matter of law.  The psychologist’s assessment could have been 
wrong.  (Evidently many people thought it was.  If you think S has the mental age 
of a toddler, you do not endorse S’s sitting in on college courses and writing 
conference papers.)  So I do not think that the fact that the State of New Jersey said 
D.J. had the mental age of a toddler entails that Stubblefield’s belief that he was 
consenting was unreasonable. 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
There is no question but that Stubblefield acted wrongly.  Even if it had been 
the case that D.J. clearly could consent to sex and was consenting, a sexual 
relationship was morally off limits because of her role as his facilitator.  It would 
have been off limits for roughly the same reason that a sexual relationship between 
                                                                                                                                      
94  This seems to have been the position of the trial court judge.  Engber reports that Judge 
Teare held that Stubblefield “knowingly and wantonly overstepped the bounds of lawful behavior.”  
Engber, supra note 32.  She “violated the terms of D.J.’s guardianship because she decided, on her 
own, that the courts were wrong—and that she knew better than the State of New Jersey.”  Id. 
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a dissertation director and her student is off limits.  It would not amount to sexual 
assault. 
She also acted wrongly in not considering the possibility that D.J. might be 
incapable of consenting to sex.  Her policy of erring in the direction of 
overestimating, rather than in underestimating, a person’s capacities (a reflection 
of the “criterion of the least dangerous assumption”)95 needed to be carefully 
bracketed.  Whether we should hold that her belief that he was consenting was 
unreasonable is not entirely clear to me, but I think that we should not.  At issue is 
both how high the standard should be, and what we think the requirement of 
reasonableness should track.  I have suggested that when we focus on the fact that 
we want an unreasonable belief to track culpability—culpability of a sort that 
warrants criminal liability—it seems clear that the motivation for the underlying 
belief or ideology on which her belief that he consented rests is relevant. 
A related way to think about it is in terms of culpable indifference.  Normally 
a mistaken belief that the other party is consenting reflects culpable indifference.  
And normally we—here I have in mind likely readers of this journal—do not deem 
the mistake reasonable.  In those rare cases where we think it may be reasonable, 
we need not only to be able to understand that the defendant could have made this 
mistake, but also to understand how it could have happened without culpable 
indifference.  In the case of Stubblefield, we can understand it, thanks to an 
ideology she subscribed to that, without a trace of ill will or unkindness or lack of 
respect, she allowed to go too far.96  
                                                                                                                                      
95  As put forward in an influential paper, Anne M. Donnellan, The Criterion of the Least 
Dangerous Assumption, 9 BEHAV. DISORDERS 141 (1984).  The proposal to err in the direction of 
overestimating a person’s capacities is picked up on by many practitioners.  See, e.g., Kate Ahern, 
Living the Least Dangerous Assumption, THINKING PERSON’S GUIDE TO AUTISM (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.thinkingautismguide.com/2010/07/living-least-dangerous-assumption.html [https://perma
.cc/4QBU-93GR] (where the author asks rhetorically how we go about living the least dangerous 
assumption, and includes among the answers: “Give the gift of assuming intentionality in 
communication,” explaining that “even if you are wrong in your assumption you will teach 
intentionality by responding as if the action was intentional”). 
96  Earlier drafts of this paper were presented to the philosophy department of Loyola 
University of Chicago (2016), a law and philosophy seminar at Georgetown University (2017), at a 
conference on sexual consent and coercion at the University of Virginia (2016), and as a keynote 
address at Northwestern Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (2017).  I am grateful to 
discussants at each event for their comments, and especially to Elizabeth Barnes, my commentator at 
the University of Virginia, and Louis-Philippe Hodgson, my commentator at NUSTEP.  Thanks too 
to Luis Chiesa, Joshua Dressler, Judith Lichtenberg, Rik Peels, Ric Simmons, and Kenneth W. 
Simons for written comments, Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt, Leonard Cassuto and Daniel Engber for 
helpful email exchanges, Eliana Elizalde and Thomas Rovito for careful editorial assistance, and 
Frederick F. Schmitt for extensive discussion. 
